Debian Bug report logs -
#618863
/usr/bin/ssh: insecurely verifies host key with VerifyHostKeyDNS option
Reported by: Rob Leslie <rob@mars.org>
Date: Sat, 19 Mar 2011 03:09:01 UTC
Severity: normal
Tags: upstream
Found in versions openssh/1:5.5p1-6, openssh/1:6.0p1-4, openssh/1:6.9p1-2
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Bug#618863; Package openssh-client.
(Sat, 19 Mar 2011 03:09:04 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Acknowledgement sent
to Rob Leslie <rob@mars.org>:
New Bug report received and forwarded. Copy sent to Debian OpenSSH Maintainers <debian-ssh@lists.debian.org>.
(Sat, 19 Mar 2011 03:09:04 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Message #5 received at submit@bugs.debian.org (full text, mbox, reply):
Package: openssh-client
Version: 1:5.5p1-6
Severity: normal
File: /usr/bin/ssh
Tags: upstream
When the VerifyHostKeyDNS option is used, ssh attempts to verify unknown
remote host keys by looking up SSHFP records in DNS. It relies on the AD
(Authentic Data) flag in the response to determine whether the fingerprint
it receives has been cryptographically verified by the resolver (i.e. with
DNSSEC) and if so, may rely on the matching host key with no further
verification.
This is insecure because ssh has no guarantee the communication between
the local (stub) resolver and an external recursive resolver which does the
cryptographic validation has not been tampered with. An attacker could
easily forge a response to the local resolver with the AD flag set.
Even if the communication could be guaranteed to be secure, relying on the
AD flag is wrong for another reason: a recursive resolver which also
happens to be authoritative for a zone is not required to check the
validity of its authoritative answers or set the AD flag in such responses.
(It will, however, set the AA flag.) [See RFC 3655 sec. 2.2]
I'm not aware of a means by which applications can securely determine
the cryptographic validity of answers to DNS queries short of performing
their own validations.
A patch to perform local DNSSEC validation for all ssh DNS lookups is
apparently included as part of DNSSEC-Tools:
http://www.dnssec-tools.org/readme/README.ssh
I would recommend that upstream consider integrating local DNSSEC
validations for all DNS lookups, and not rely on the AD flag at all.
-- System Information:
Debian Release: 6.0
APT prefers stable
APT policy: (990, 'stable'), (500, 'squeeze-updates')
Architecture: i386 (i686)
Kernel: Linux 2.6.38 (SMP w/2 CPU cores)
Locale: LANG=en_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_US.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8)
Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash
Versions of packages openssh-client depends on:
ii adduser 3.112+nmu2 add and remove users and groups
ii debconf [de 1.5.36.1 Debian configuration management sy
ii dpkg 1.15.8.10 Debian package management system
ii libc6 2.11.2-11 Embedded GNU C Library: Shared lib
ii libedit2 2.11-20080614-2 BSD editline and history libraries
ii libgssapi-k 1.8.3+dfsg-4 MIT Kerberos runtime libraries - k
ii libssl0.9.8 0.9.8o-4squeeze1 SSL shared libraries
ii passwd 1:4.1.4.2+svn3283-2+squeeze1 change and administer password and
ii zlib1g 1:1.2.3.4.dfsg-3 compression library - runtime
Versions of packages openssh-client recommends:
ii openssh-blacklist 0.4.1 list of default blacklisted OpenSS
ii openssh-blacklist-extra 0.4.1 list of non-default blacklisted Op
ii xauth 1:1.0.4-1 X authentication utility
Versions of packages openssh-client suggests:
ii keychain 2.6.8-2 key manager for OpenSSH
pn libpam-ssh <none> (no description available)
pn ssh-askpass <none> (no description available)
-- no debconf information
Information forwarded
to debian-bugs-dist@lists.debian.org, Debian OpenSSH Maintainers <debian-ssh@lists.debian.org>:
Bug#618863; Package openssh-client.
(Thu, 17 Jan 2013 22:45:03 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Acknowledgement sent
to Philipp Kern <pkern@debian.org>:
Extra info received and forwarded to list. Copy sent to Debian OpenSSH Maintainers <debian-ssh@lists.debian.org>.
(Thu, 17 Jan 2013 22:45:03 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Message #10 received at 618863@bugs.debian.org (full text, mbox, reply):
[Message part 1 (text/plain, inline)]
On Fri, Mar 18, 2011 at 07:41:36PM -0700, Rob Leslie wrote:
> When the VerifyHostKeyDNS option is used, ssh attempts to verify unknown
> remote host keys by looking up SSHFP records in DNS. It relies on the AD
> (Authentic Data) flag in the response to determine whether the fingerprint
> it receives has been cryptographically verified by the resolver (i.e. with
> DNSSEC) and if so, may rely on the matching host key with no further
> verification.
Interestingly the default changed from "yes" to "no" at some point.
openssh (1:5.4p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
* Borrow patch from Fedora to add DNSSEC support: if glibc 2.11 is
installed, the host key is published in an SSHFP RR secured with DNSSEC,
and VerifyHostKeyDNS=yes, then ssh will no longer prompt for host key
verification (closes: #572049).
[…]
-- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org> Sat, 10 Apr 2010 01:08:59 +0100
And I just had to flip it on manually. The manual page also says that
it's off byd efault.
The problem with authoriative servers not setting AD is also something I
personally experienced and which is quite annoying. But then I agree
that authoriative and recursor should be split nowadays, although it's a
bit hard to do in a home network environment.
Kind regards
Philipp Kern
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Information forwarded
to debian-bugs-dist@lists.debian.org, Debian OpenSSH Maintainers <debian-ssh@lists.debian.org>:
Bug#618863; Package openssh-client.
(Mon, 29 Jul 2013 08:33:04 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Acknowledgement sent
to Richard Salts <dbts@spectralmud.org>:
Extra info received and forwarded to list. Copy sent to Debian OpenSSH Maintainers <debian-ssh@lists.debian.org>.
(Mon, 29 Jul 2013 08:33:05 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Message #15 received at 618863@bugs.debian.org (full text, mbox, reply):
Package: openssh-client
Version: 1:6.0p1-4
Followup-For: Bug #618863
openssh now includes a configure option to link to ldns for verification of
the dnssec service rather than relying on the +ad bit in a response for a
resolver. Maybe it would be worth adding that to the configuration options on
the deb ( although probably not necessary on the udeb).
-- System Information:
Debian Release: 7.1
APT prefers stable
APT policy: (900, 'stable')
Architecture: i386 (x86_64)
Kernel: Linux 3.2.0-4-amd64 (SMP w/4 CPU cores)
Locale: LANG=en_AU.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=en_AU.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8)
Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/bash
Versions of packages openssh-client depends on:
ii adduser 3.113+nmu3
ii debconf [debconf-2.0] 1.5.49
ii dpkg 1.16.10
ii libc6 2.13-38
ii libedit2 2.11-20080614-5
ii libgssapi-krb5-2 1.10.1+dfsg-5+deb7u1
ii libselinux1 2.1.9-5
ii libssl1.0.0 1.0.1e-2
ii passwd 1:4.1.5.1-1
ii zlib1g 1:1.2.7.dfsg-13
Versions of packages openssh-client recommends:
ii openssh-blacklist 0.4.1+nmu1
ii openssh-blacklist-extra 0.4.1+nmu1
ii xauth 1:1.0.7-1
Versions of packages openssh-client suggests:
pn keychain <none>
pn libpam-ssh <none>
pn monkeysphere <none>
ii ssh-askpass 1:1.2.4.1-9
-- Configuration Files:
/etc/ssh/ssh_config changed [not included]
-- no debconf information
Information forwarded
to debian-bugs-dist@lists.debian.org, Debian OpenSSH Maintainers <debian-ssh@lists.debian.org>:
Bug#618863; Package openssh-client.
(Thu, 12 Nov 2015 03:36:08 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Acknowledgement sent
to martin f krafft <madduck@debian.org>:
Extra info received and forwarded to list. Copy sent to Debian OpenSSH Maintainers <debian-ssh@lists.debian.org>.
(Thu, 12 Nov 2015 03:36:08 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Message #20 received at 618863@bugs.debian.org (full text, mbox, reply):
[Message part 1 (text/plain, inline)]
Package: openssh-client
Version: 1:6.9p1-2+b1
Followup-For: Bug #618863
It appears that /usr/bin/ssh still does not verify the DNS
information properly. What's the status of this issue? What is
upstream's take? Has this issue been taken upstream?
-- System Information:
Debian Release: stretch/sid
APT prefers unstable
APT policy: (500, 'unstable'), (1, 'experimental')
Architecture: amd64 (x86_64)
Foreign Architectures: i386
Kernel: Linux 4.2.0-1-amd64 (SMP w/4 CPU cores)
Locale: LANG=en_NZ, LC_CTYPE=en_NZ.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8)
Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash
Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system)
Versions of packages openssh-client depends on:
ii adduser 3.113+nmu3
ii dpkg 1.18.3
ii libc6 2.19-22
ii libedit2 3.1-20150325-1
ii libgssapi-krb5-2 1.13.2+dfsg-4
ii libselinux1 2.3-2+b1
ii libssl1.0.2 1.0.2d-3
ii passwd 1:4.2-3
ii zlib1g 1:1.2.8.dfsg-2+b1
Versions of packages openssh-client recommends:
ii xauth 1:1.0.9-1
Versions of packages openssh-client suggests:
pn keychain <none>
pn libpam-ssh <none>
ii monkeysphere 0.37-3
ii ssh-askpass-gnome [ssh-askpass] 1:6.9p1-2+b1
-- debconf-show failed
--
.''`. martin f. krafft <madduck@d.o> @martinkrafft
: :' : proud Debian developer
`. `'` http://people.debian.org/~madduck
`- Debian - when you have better things to do than fixing systems
[digital_signature_gpg.asc (application/pgp-signature, inline)]
Information forwarded
to debian-bugs-dist@lists.debian.org, Debian OpenSSH Maintainers <debian-ssh@lists.debian.org>:
Bug#618863; Package openssh-client.
(Mon, 01 Apr 2019 03:39:03 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Acknowledgement sent
to sergio <sergio+it@outerface.net>:
Extra info received and forwarded to list. Copy sent to Debian OpenSSH Maintainers <debian-ssh@lists.debian.org>.
(Mon, 01 Apr 2019 03:39:03 GMT) (full text, mbox, link).
Message #25 received at 618863@bugs.debian.org (full text, mbox, reply):
https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2119
--
sergio.
--
sergio.
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